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ARTICLES
THE AXIOLOGY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Surya Prakash Sinhat
The purpose of this article is: (i) to show that the axiology
of the international bill of human rights consists predominatly
of the values of individualism and legalism; (ii) to demonstrate
that individualism and legalism have been the central values of
social organization in the particular historicity of Western civili-
zation, whereas such has not been the case with the value sys-
tems of the Chinese, Japanese, Indian, African, and Islamic civi-
lizations, so that the bill's single-catalog approach' of pre-
scribing one set of values for all civilizations does not take an
adequate account of these different value systems; and, (iii) to
argue for a revision of the bill, so as to make it isomorphic to the
civilizational pluralism of the world of today. In the process, I
shall attempt an explanation for this pluralistic insensitivity of
the bill, emphasize the valuable contribution that this bill never-
theless makes toward securing human rights in this multi-
civilizational world, and point out the undesirable consequences
of its single-catalog approach. Thus, I hope not to have made an
argument for the condemnation of the bill but a positive argu-
t B.Com., LL.B., C.W.A., M.S., LL.M., J.S.D.; Professor of Law, Pace University
School of Law; Associate, Columbia University Seminar on the Problem of Peace.
See generally, Sinha, The Missing First Step in the Human Rights Movement,
American Branch, International Law Association, Proceedings and Committee Reports,
71 (1985-86); Sinha, Freeing Human Rights from Natural Rights, 70 ARCHIV FUR
RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 342 (1984); Sinha, Human Rights: A Non- Western View-
point, 67 ARCHIv FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 76 (1981); Sinha, Human Rights
Philosophically, 18 IND. J. INT'L L. 139 (1978); Sinha, The Anthropocentric Theory of
International Law as a Basis for Human Rights, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469 (Human
Rights Issue 1978).
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ment for the strengthening of it.
It is no small miracle for the human being living under the
society of sovereign States to have achieved the recognition of
his human rights by them and to have secured the State's inter-
national legal obligations with respect to such rights. The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,2 the International Cove-
nant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,3 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' along with
its Optional Protocol,6 are all designed to secure the physical
and spiritual existence of the individual." Besides this interna-
tional bill of human rights,7 there are two regional treaties
designed for that purpose, namely, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms8 and the American
Convention on Human Rights.9 In addition, the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights has been adopted,10 and has re-
cently come into force. The international lawyer, therefore, is no
longer limited merely to seeking a philosophical basis for the
' Adopted and Proclaimed by U.N. GAOR Res. 217 (III) of 10 Dec. 1948.
' Adopted by the General Assemby of the United Nations on 16 Dec. 1966, opened
for signature on 19 Dec. 1966, entered into force on 3 Jan. 1976 in accordance with art.
27, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
4 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 Dec. 1966, opened
for signature on 19 Dec. 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976 in accordance with
art. 49 for all provisions except those of art. 41 and on 28 March 1979 for the provisions
of art. 41 (Human Rights Committee) in accordance with para. 2, of art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 Dec. 1966, opened
for signature on 19 Dec. 1966, entered into force on 23 Mar. 1976 in accordance with art.
9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
' For the position of the individual in international law see S.P. SINHA, ASYLUM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (ch. IV 1971).
' At its first session in London in January 1946, the United Nations General Assem-
bly forwarded a draft Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms to the
Economic and Social Council for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights in
its preparation of an 'international bill of human rights.' After exploring different views
as to the possible form of this bill of rights, the Commission decided that it should take
the form of a declaration, a convention to be called the Covenant on Human Rights, and
measures of implementation. Eventually, it came to consist of one Declaration and two
Covenants, as mentioned above.
8 Signed on 4 Nov. 1950, entered into force on 3 Sept. 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
' Signed on 22 Nov. 1969, entered into force on 18 July 1978, O.A.T.S. No. 36 at 1,
O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.LVf/II.23, Doc. 21.
1" Adopted on 27 June 1981, Organization of African Unity Doc. CABILEG/67/3
Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/2
HUMAN RIGHTS
human rights movement, though significant as that basis is,1"
but has at his disposal substantial positive law to work with."
As a result of these developments, the ideology of human rights
has found a significant place in the politics of today's world
making it inconvenient for governments to reject it."
The objective of the international bill of human rights is to
secure the physical and spiritual existence of the human being
on earth, as contrasted with promoting State interests as some
have in the past.' 4 Different civilizations have produced different
ways for securing human existence on earth. However, the bill
has adopted what I have disapprovingly called the single-catalog
1 See generally, Sinha, Freeing Human Rights from Natural Rights, 70 ARCHIVTUR
RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHiE 342 (1984); Sinha, Human Rights Philosophically, 18
IND. J. INT'L L. 139 (1970); Sinha, The Anthropencentric Theory of International Law as
a Basis for Human Rights, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469 (Human Rights Issue 1978);
Compare with Fryer, Contemplating Sinha's Anthropocentric Theory of International
Law on a Basis for Human Rights, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 575 (1980).
12 There has been human rights activity previously, both through national legisla-
tion and international agreements, and both in the recent as well as in the remote past.
See Sinha, The Antropencentric Theory of International Law as a Basis for Human
Rights, supra note 1, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 470, 470-75 (1978); J. VERzIJL, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1958); F. VAN ASBECK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1949); Z. CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMEN-
TAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1951); CH. DE VISSCHER, THEORIE ET REALITES EN DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 158-65 (1955); Rommen, Vers l'internationalization des droits de
l'homme, 1 JUSTICE DANS LE MONDE 163 (1959); Hamburger, Droits de l'homme et rela-
tions internationales, 97 RECUEIL DES COURS 293, 303 (1969); Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Quel-
ques problemes de la mise en ouvre de ta dclaration universelle de droits de l'homme,
83 RECUEIL DES COURS 255, 268 (1953); A. VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA
D]§CLARATION UNIVERSELLE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME (intro. ch. I n.d.); P. N. DROST, HUMAN
RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS (ch. I 1951); H. R. ROBERTSON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
(1972); Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth
Century in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 75 (Bos 1973).
13 THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (Henkin 1981) ("[Tlhe universal acceptance
of the idea of human rights and its general content may be only formal and superficial,
in some cases even hypocritical, but no government dissents from the ideology of human
rights today or offers an alternative to it.").
" Earlier provisions for human rights in the international field were adopted to pro-
mote state interests. For example, human rights provisions were included in the minority
treaties to impose obligations upon the vanquished States while exempting the victorious
States from them; or, in the Mandates System, to secure the mandated territories for the
mandatory powers; or, in the various labor conventions of the International Labor Or-
ganization, to secure the competitiveness of products by ensuring that the costs of im-
proving labor conditions at home are incurred by the competitors as well. See L. HENKIN,
THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 92 (1978); Sinha, Freeing Human Rights from Natural
Rights, 70 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 343 (1984).
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approach,15 where under primarily one set of values is prescribed
for all peoples of the world. This flies in the face of the tenacity
with which civilizational pluralism has existed in the world
throughout its history and as it continues to exist today.
At any given period in history, three to four civilizations
have existed contemporaneously."6 Between 4000 B.C. and 3000
B.C. to 1700 B.C., Sumer-Akkad-and-Mesopotamia existed along
" Sinha, Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint, supra note 1.
16 See generally, B. & F.R. ALLCHIN, THE BIRTH OF INDIAN CIVILIZATION: INDIA AND
PAKISTAN BEFORE 500 B.C. (1968); A.L. BASHAM, THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA, (rev. ed.
1963); BYZANTIUM (Baynes & Moss 1961); G.M. BECKMANN, THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA
AND JAPAN (1962); R. BLOCK, ORIGINS OF ROME (1960); H. BORTON, JAPAN'S MODERN CEN-
TURY (1955); J.B. BURY, HISTORY OF GREECE TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (3d
ed. 1951); J.F. CADY, SOUTHEAST ASIA: ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (1964); M. CARY, HIS-
TORY OF ROME DOWN TO THE REIGN OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT (2d ed. 1954); L. CHI, THE
BEGINNINGS OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1957); V.G. CHILDE, THE DAWN OF EUROPEAN CIVI-
LIZATION (6th ed. 1958); V.G. CHILDE, WHAT HAPPENED IN HISTORY (1946); C.N. COCHRANE,
CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE (1944); M.D. COE, AMERICA'S FIRST CIVILIZATION
(1968); C.C. COON, THE ORIGIN OF RACES (1962); RECONSTRUCTING AFRICAN CULTURAL
HISTORY (Creighton 1967); D. DAWSON, THE MAKING OF EUROPE (1932); THE AMERICAS ON
THE EVE OF DISCOVERY (Driver 1964); M.I. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS (1954); H.
FRANKFORT, THE BIRTH OF CIVILIZATION IN NEAR EAST (1951); J. GERNET, ANCIENT CHINA
FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO THE EMPIRE (1968); R. GHIRSHMAN, IRAN FROM THE EARLIEST
TIMES TO THE ISLAMIC CONQUEST (1961); H.A.R. GIBB, MODERN TRENDS IN ISLAM (1947);
HAR. GIBS, MOHAMMEDANISM: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (2d ed. 1953); L.C. GOODRICH, A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE (3d ed. 1959); R. GROUSSET, THE EMPIRE OF THE
STEPPES (1970);UNITY AND VARIETY IN MUSLIM CIVILZATION (von Gruenbaum 1955); D.G.E.
HALL, A HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1955); C.H. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE
TWELFTH CENTURY (1927); I.C.Y. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA (1970); P.O. KRISTEL-
LER, RENAISSANCE THOUGH. THE CLASSIC, SCHOLASTIC, AND HUMANIST STRAINS (rev. ed. 2
vols. 1961); D.F. LACH, ASIA IN THE MAKING OF EUROPE, I: THE CENTURY OF DISCOVERY
(1965); B. LEWIS, THE ARABS IN HISTORY (1950); R.S. LOPEZ, THE BIRTH OF EUROPE (1967);
MAJUMDAR & PUSALKER, HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, I: THE VEDIC AGE
(1951); W.H. McNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST (1963); W.H. McNEILL, A WORLD HISTORY
(2d ed. 1971); CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN (Momtagu 1962); R. OLIVER & A.
ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800 (1967); R.R. PALMER & J. COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
WORLD (2d ed. 1956); K.M. PANIKKAR, A SURVEY OF INDIAN HISTORY (3d ed. 1956); J.H.
PARRY, EUROPE AND A WIDER WORLD 1445, 1415-1715 (1949); ASPECTS OF CENTRAL AFRI-
CAN HISTORY (Ranger 1968); E.O. REISCHAUER, J.K. FAIRBANK & A.M. CRAIG, A HISTORY OF
EAST ASIAN CIVILIZATION, IT: EAST ASIA: A MODERN TRANSFORMATION (1965); G.B. SANSOM,
JAPAN: A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY (rev. ed. 1962); KAN. SASTRI, A HISTORY OF SOUTH
INDIA FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE FALL OF VIJAYANAGAR (3d ed. 1966); S.P. SINHA,
NEW NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1967); V.A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
INDIA (3d ed. 1958); W.C. SMITH ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY (1957); P. SPEAR, INDIA: A
MODERN HISTORY (1961); H. TREVOR-ROPER, THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN EUROPE (1965); M.
WHEELER, ROME BEYOND IMPERIAL FRONTIERS (1955); R.E.M. WHEELER, EARLY INDIA AND
PAKISTAN, TO ASHOKA (1959); R.E.M. WHEELER, THE INDUS CIVILIZATION, THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF INDIA, (3d ed. Supp. vol. 1968).
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the Tigris and Euphratus rivers, Egypt along the Nile, and
Harappa-and-Mohenjodaro in the Inuds valley. Between 1700
B.C. and 500 B.C., the Middle Eastern, Indian, Greek, and Chi-
nese civilizations established themselves, providing four distinct
life styles and value systems. Between 500 B.C. and 1500 A.D.,
cross-cultural borrowings and disturbances were not able to dis-
place the autonomous existence of these civilizations. No single
center of civilized life achieved a definite preponderance, while
the barbarians on the margins of these civilizations only mixed
elements of one civilization with another. The life styles within
each of these civilizations continued to grow and modify them-
selves. Contact among them increased over the centuries, cross-
cultural borrowings flourished, and even major upheavals oc-
curred, namely: (a) the expansion of the Greek and the Indian
civilizations beyond their borders, although the Hellenization of
the Middle East and the Indianization of China and Japan re-
mained only superficial and temporary; (b) the rise of Islam and
its expansion first into the ancient Middle East, North Africa,
and Spain (632-1000 A.D.), and then into India, Eastern Europe,
and Central Asia (1000-1453 A.D.); and (c) the rise of the Euro-
pean enterprise. But no one civilization displaced the others. Be-
tween 1500 and 1850 A.D., the European society strengthened
and expanded its dominion over the globe, subduing, by 1700
A.D., the Islamic peoples, the Hindus, and the Buddhists. By
about 1850 A.D., the Ottoman, Mughal, Manchus, and Japanese
empires succumbed decisively to the West, all within one single
decade.
Inside Europe, beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth
century, the twin movements of industrialization and democrati-
zation transformed the Western institutions in a fundamental
way. Eventually, the European empires extended over nearly all
of Africa and much of Asia. Since the end of World War II,
these empires have been dismantled to create new nations from
the erstwhile colonies of the Western powers. The new nations
have adopted the European system of international law.1" They
have launched modernization along selective Westernization.
The nature of their political, military, intellectual, cultural, and
economic interrelationships is such that some historians see in it
" See S.P. SINHA, supra note 16.
1989]
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an age of global cosmopolitanism.18
However, none of this has eliminated the civilizational plu-
ralism of the world. There still persist different cultures pursu-
ing different life styles along different value systems. For exam-
ple, the Confucian traditions are still followed in China in that
education and persuasion are used as the instrument for social
peace rather than the principle of legality. Conflict resolution is
sought primarily by appeal to conscience rather than by pursu-
ing rights in courts of law. In Japan, the Western-style law
makes sense only to a very small segment of Japanese Society
comprising of middle class individuals. These individuals fashion
their relations on the basis of freedom and liberty, while most
people continue to live within the Confucian idea of hierarchy
based on natural order and arrange their personal relations
along the traditional giri-ninjo (rules of behavior).
Africa witnessed a noticeable activity of modernization
along Western models, but eighty or ninety percent of its popu-
lation continues to live according to ancient custom and are
largely unaware of the cities' institutions, and generally unaf-
fected by the reform legislation. It continues to use the tradi-
tional procedures of conciliation for disputes rather than state
courts.
The Muslim countries vary in the pervasiveness of Islam
but, by and large, their peoples continue to pursue life according
to the Islamic concept of personal morals and societal order as
applied to their own particular social conditions. The Hindus
constitute nearly eighty-five percent of the population of India
and their life, for the most part, moves along the traditional
ways of Dharma. The joint-family, rather than the individual,
continues to exist as the fundamental unit of social order.
Thus from these examples, civilizational pluralism persists.
No plan for human rights can expect to succeed if it ignores this
basic fact. Techniques of the West and even its life styles have
been adopted by the world in varying degrees. Nevertheless,
there continues to exist various value systems among various
peoples of the world, manifesting different approaches to human
emancipation. In this axiological pluralism, the single-catalog
approach of the present international bill of human rights is not
"' See, e.g., W.H. McNEIL, A WORLD HISTORY (2d ed. 1971).
[Vol. 1:21
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sufficient. It needs to be amended to accommodate this
pluralism.
The fundamental values19 underlying the structure of the
international bill of human rights are predominantly individual-
ism and legalism, although there are some provisions in its in-
struments which are not so narrowly circumscribed. I will
demonstrate this by analyzing the articles of these instruments,
at the end of which I will have accounted for all of the thirty
Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the thirty-one Articles of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the fifty-
three Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR).
For the purpose of this analysis, let me suggest that there
are six areas of human existence which are of concern to human
rights, namely: (1) integrity of the person; (2) personal relation-
ships; (3) social assertion; (4) economic well-being; (5) political
assertion; and (6) conflict resolution.
(1) Integrity of the person: Articles 3, 4, 5, 9, and 12 of the
UDHR and Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17 of the
ICCPR ° address themselves to the integrity of the person as a
,9 On the meaning of values, see generally, B. BLANSHARD, REASON AND GOODNESS
(1961); W.K. FRANKENA, ETHICS (1963); R. FRONDIZI, WHAT IS VALUE? (Lipp trans. 1963);
A.C. GARNETT, THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN (ch. 4 1952); J. LAIRD, THE IDEA OF VALUE
(1929); VALUE: A COOPERATIVE INQUIRY (R. Lepley 1949); THE LANGUAGE OF VALUE (Lep-
ley 1957); P.H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS (1954).
20 For the practice of The Human Rights Committee, established under art. 28 of
the ICCPR see, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights
Committee: Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (Second to Sixteenth Ses-
sions), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1(1985) [hereinafter Selected Decisions], for art. 6:
Comm. Nos. 30/1978, 45/1979; for art. 7: Comm. Nos. 4/1977, 5/1977, 8/1977, 9/1977, 11/
1977, 25/1978, 28/1978, 30/1978, 33/1978, 37/1978, 52/1979, 63/1979, 73/1980; for art.
9(1): Comm. Nos. 4/1977, 5/1977, 8/1977, 25/1978, 30/1978, 33/1978, 37/1978, 46/1979,
52/1979, 56/1979, 64/1979, 91/1981; for art. 9(2): Comm. Nos. 33/1978, 44/1979, 46/1979;
for art. 9(3): Comm. Nos. 5/1977, 6/1977, 8/1977, 10/1977, 11/1977, 28/1978, 32/1978, 33/
1978, 37/1978, 44/1979, 46/1979, 52/1979, 63/1979, 73/1980; for art. 9(4): Comm. Nos. 4/
1977, 5/1977, 6/1977, 8/1977, 9/1977, 10/1977, 11/1977, 25/1978, 28/1978, 32/1978, 33/
1978, 37/1978, 44/1979, 46/1979, 91/1981; for art. 9(5): Comm. Nos. 9/1977, 91/1981; for
art. 10(1): Comm. Nos. 4/1977, 5/1977, 8/1977, 10/1977, 11/1977, 25/1977, 27/1978, 28/
1978, 30/1978, 33/1978, 37/1978, 44/1979, 56/1979, 63/1979, 70/1980, 73/1980; for art.
10(2): Comm. No. 27/1978; for art. 11: Comm. No. 91/1981; for art. 12: Comm. Nos. 24/
1977, 31/1978, 52/1979, 57/1979, 68/1980; for art. 13: Comm. Nos. 27/1978, 58/1979; for
art. 17: Comm. Nos. 24/1977, 27/1978, 35/1978, 68/1980.
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human being. They provide for: life, liberty, and security of per-
son; freedom of movement and choice of residence; protection
from slavery, servitude, forced labor, torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion, exile, arbitrary interference with home privacy, and attacks
upon honor and reputation. These are not the provisions which
are circumscribed within the Western axiology of individualism
and legalism to the exclusion of other value systems. However,
other provisions are.
(2) Personal relationships: Article 16 of the UDHR, Articles
23 and 24 of the ICCPR,21 and Article 10 of ICESCR provide
protection for personal relationships of the human being,
namely, the relationships of family, marriage, and children. In
doing so, they regard the individual as the fundamental unit of
society and the nuclear family as its funadamental group unit.
This is an eloquent expression of individualism, which is fine.
But the provisions stop there. They do not go on any further in
taking an adequate account of, say: the hierarchical family of
China or Japan; the Hindu joint-family; or the African lineage
and kinship systems of the Tallensi, Ashanti, Hausa-Fulani, Yo-
ruba, Ibo, Tiv, Ganda, Lugbara, Kikuyu, Nandi, Arusha, Nyaky-
usa, and Nuer peoples.
(3) Social assertion: Articles 1, 2, and 27 of the UDHR, Ar-
ticles 2, 3, and 18 of the ICCPR, 2 and Article 15 of the ICESCR
assure social assertion of the human being by treating all human
beings similarly based on equality. These Articles eliminate dis-
tinctions in human rights on the basis of: race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth, status, or political status of a person's
country. These Articles achieve this by providing for participa-
tion in the cultural life of the community and enjoyment of the
benefits of scientific progress, by granting equal rights to men
and women, and by providing freedom of thought, conscience,
For the practice of the Human Rights Committee, see Selected Decisions, supra
note 20, for art. 23: Comm. Nos. 24/1977, 35/1978, 68/1980; for art. 24: Comm. No. 24/
1977.
11 For the practice of the Human Rights Committee, see Selected Decisions, supra
note 20, for art. 2: Comm. Nos. 9/1977, 19/1977, 24/1977, 25/1978, 28/1978, 35/1978, 50/
1979, 52/1979, 56/1979, 57/1979, 79/1989, 81/1980; for art. 3: Comm. Nos. 24/1977, 35/
1978; for art. 18: Comm. No. 40/1978.
[Vol. 1:21
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and religion. While most of these provisions are not limited by
the individualistic axiology, individualism does assert itself in
the provision for equality. This is quite satisfactory for the
Western civilization. However, these Articles do not go on fur-
ther to provide for other civilizations, such as the Japanese,23
which seek human emancipation on the basis of hierarchical, not
equal, relationships and who believe that the notion of equal
rights depersonalizes human relations by putting all persons on
an equal basis.
(4) Economic well-being: Articles 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26
of the UDHR and Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the
ICESCR assure the economic well-being and education of the
human being. They provide for the right to: work, choice of em-
ployment, fair wages, safe and healthy working conditions, job
promotions, rest, leisure, reasonable working hours, holidays,
form and join trade unions, social security, an adequate stan-
dard of living, physical and mental health, education, and to
own property.24 These provisions represent lessons learned and
wisdom acquired from practicing industrial economies in the
West. Moreover, their relevance is not limited to the West alone,
but to all industrialized and industrializing societies. However,
these Articles stop short of addressing themselves to other eco-
nomic styles in the world, such as, for example, the rural India
or non-industrial Africa.
(5) Political assertion: Articles 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 21
of the UDHR and Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27 of the
ICCPR21 lay down fine principles of democracy, namely: free-
dom of opinion and expression, prohibition of propaganda, free-
dom of association, peaceful assembly, participation in public af-
fairs, access to public service, equal protection of law, protection
of minorities, freedom of movement, right to seek asylum,2" right
23 See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
" The right to own property was included in art. 17 of the UDHR but dropped
completely from the Covenants.
21 For the practice of the Human Rights Committee, see Selected Decisions, supra
note 20, for art. 19: Comm. Nos. 8/1977, 11/1977, 28/1978, 31/1978, 33/1978, 44/1979, 52/
1979, 61/1979; for art. 22(1): Comm. No. 52/1979; for art. 25: Comm. Nos. 5/1977, 10/
1977, 19/1977, 28/1978, 34/1978, 35/1978, 44/1979; for art. 26: Comm. Nos. 17/1977, 24/
1977, 28/1978, 35/1978, 68/1980; for art. 27: Comm. No. 24/1977.
"* See generally, S.P. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); Sinha, An An-
thropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78
19891
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to nationality, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
These provisions are remarkable in that they are not content
with merely making vague references to something called de-
mocracy or debating the appropriateness of the nomenclature
for a particular government; they lay down specific principles of
government most conducive to securing the human being. These
principles of politics are very important for achieving human
rights, but since our focus here is on the value systems, I shall
not dwell upon these principles of politics.
(6) Conflict resolution: Articles 6, 7, 8, and 10 of the UDHR
and Articles 9, 14, 16, and 17 of the ICCPR 27 provide for the
means for resolving conflicts and disputes. They choose law as
the favored means for this purpose and elaborate the principles
of a desirable court system. They thus give a clear expression to
legalism as the fundamental value in the sphere of conflict reso-
lution. Once again, however, they stop there and do not provide
for the means of conflict resolution practiced in non-Western
civilizations. In China, for example, the honorable course is not
assertion of rights through recourse to law but conciliation; law
being appropriate for dealing with the foreigner who is alien to
the Chinese values, the morally perverse, the incorrigible crimi-
nal, and the counter-revolutionery.2 a In Japan, conciliation pro-
cedures of jidan, wakai, and chotei are preferred and law is
deemed appropriate only for depersonalized matters of business
and industry.2 9 Nor do law and its institutions form part of the
traditional modes used by the African peoples for resolving
conflicts."
Thus, these instruments are too restrictive to give expres-
sion to the principles used by all of the world's civilizations for
securing a human being's personal integrity, personal relation-
(1971).
2 For the practice of the Human Rights Committee, see Selected Decisions, supra
note 20, for art. 9: supra note 20; for art. 14(1): Comm. Nos. 5/1977, 6/1977, 8/1977, 10/
1977, 17/1977, 27/1978, 28/1978, 32/1978, 44/1979, 46/1979, 64/1979, 70/1980, 81/1980; for
art. 14(2): Comm. Nos. 5/1977, 8/1977, 46/1979; for art. 14(3): Comm. Nos. 4/1977, 5/
1977, 6/1977, 8/1977, 10/1977, 27/1978, 28/1978, 32/1978, 33/1978, 44/1979, 46/1979, 52/
1979, 56/1979, 63/1979, 70/1980, 73/1980; for art. 14(5): Comm. Nos. 27/1978, 46/1979,
64/1979; for art. 17: Comm. Nos. 24/1977, 27/1978, 35/1978, 68/1980, 79/1980.
28 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
00 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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ships, social assertion, economic well-being, political assertion,
and modes of conflict resolution. The remaining articles of these
instruments, namely, Articles 28, 29, and 30 of the UDHR, Arti-
cles 1, 4, 5, 15, and 28 to 53 of the ICCPR, and Articles 1 to 5
and 16 to 31 of the ICESR deal with non-axiological matters.
The axiological Articles examined above show that they are
predominantly grounded in the values of individualism and
legalism.
I shall now demonstrate that while individualism and legal-
ism have been the central values of social organization in the
particular historicity of the Western civilization; such has not
been the case with other major civilizations of the world, such as
the Chinese, Japanese, Indian, African, and Islamic, which have
developed their own central values in their own particular
historicity.
A. The Western Civilization: Two significant tendencies ap-
peared early on in Greek history. The territorial State prevailed
over other modes of human association as the most important
political organization and the world was explained through the
laws of nature. The earliest Greek invaders settled in the Aegean
islands and on the mainland. Knossos was destroyed by the
Mainland Mycenaeans in 1400 B.C., and for two hundred years
thereafter the Mycenaeans plied the coasts of the Mediterra-
nean. Soon after 1200 B.C., the Greek-speaking Dorians from
the north invaded the Mycenaean centers of power. The dis-
placed refugees fled across the Aegean to coastal Asia Minor
where, in the absence of any pre-existing system of governance,
they created a set of laws and governmental systems. The earli-
est polis, or the Greek city-states, were established wherein law
became the means of governance and cooperation. The polis de-
veloped on the mainland as well, though slowly. There, too, law
and its magistrates performed a central function in social organi-
zation. At Ionia, the philosophers began explaining the phenom-
ena by the exercise of imaginative reason and they replaced gods
by natural law as the ruling force of the universe. The Greek
mind evolved through four stages, namely: the Heroic Mind, the
Visionary Mind, the Theoretical Mind, and the Rational Mind,
and it created the notion of man as possessed of reason, freedom
of choice, and ability to make decisions. As such, he lived for his
own sake and not for the sake of some exalted human being or
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supernatural entity. Individualism thus came to be established.
This resulted in a polity in which citizens possessed rights which
were held in common under the rule of law. Law was the means
through which these rights were realized.
In 338 B.C., the sovereignty of the local polis was destroyed
by the Macedonian conquest. Meanwhile, Rome emerged as a
power. Although Latin became the prevailing language in the
long period of peace of the Roman Emperors, the Hellenistic civ-
ilization spread to Italy, Gaul and Spain. Philosophers like Cic-
ero produced ideas that government originated in a voluntary
agreement of citizens and law was the paramount principle of
government. Roman law became important. It was codified. Civil
war and invasion from the Steppe barbarians, during 235 B.C. to
84 A.D., brought the Roman era to a close. Christianity emerged
as an historic force. The Latin (Roman Catholic) and the Greek
(Orthodox) Christendoms were formally separated in 1054 A.D.,
and Latin Christendom spread in Europe through conversion
and conquest. Christianity shifted the thought from natural phi-
losophy to revelation. God's power sustained both the spiritual
and secular orders. Human existence was meaningful only inso-
far as it reconciled the man with his Maker. The individual was
subordinated to a collective world order.
Man, however, returned to the center of things with Refor-
mation which, along with its rival movement of Renaissance, en-
gendered a self-transformation of Europe during the period 1500
to 1648 A.D. Individualism reasserted itself. It insisted, as the
Protestants did, that man was his own mediator with God. It
challenged the centralized political authority. It legitimized po-
litical needs of the individual rulers. It instituted capitalism in
the economic field. Once again, it was law which provided the
technique of social organization in this individualistic, non-feu-
dal, non-tribal, non-communal, and non-caste frame of society.
During the period 1648 to 1789, both the Church and the State
retreated from enforcing conformity to truth. Consequently,
trained professionals emerged in all walks of life. It was no
longer necessary to create and impose one overall synthesis of all
truth and knowledge. Therefore, specialized professions flour-
ished, including that of law.
During the period 1789 to 1914, the industrial revolution
and the democratic revolution transformed the Western civiliza-
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tion. While the industrial revolution increased the West's wealth
and accelerated the growth of its population, the democratic
revolution established the notion that governments were man-
made. Law played its own significiant role in these processes and
provided a central mechanism for social organization. Social
change further intensified during the period 1914 to 1945, with
the discovery that economies could concentrate effort on partic-
ular goals and that human societies could be deliberately
manipulated for peace as well as war. Consequently, society and
economy were no longer considered natural. Instead, they be-
came amenable to conscious control. Law played a central role in
the management of these matters. It continues to do so in the
period following 1945. Thus, individualism and legalism are an
experience of the particular historicity of the Western
civilization.3
B. The Chinese Civilization: Such is not the case with the
Chinese civilization. Although neolithic Black Pottery people are
considered ancestral to the historical Chinese and farming began
in the Yellow River before 3000 B.C., the Hsia are regarded as
the first rulers of China, followed by the Shang dynasty (1523-
1028 B.C.), which was overthrown by the Chou in 1501 B.C. A
barbarian attack in 771 B.C. destroyed the western Chou dy-
nasty (1501 to 771 B.C.), but the Chinese civilization expanded
rapidly with the later or the eastern Chou dynasty (770-256
B.C.), particularly at the end of the period of the warring states
(402-221 B.C.). The Chou abolished the Shang rituals and
human sacrifice and explained their own power in terms of a
mandate from heaven where under the Son of Heaven ruled as
long as he behaved piously and properly. They adopted a cos-
" See generally, BYZANTIUM (Baynes & Moss 1961); C.M. BOWRA, THE GREEK EXPE-
RIENCE (1957); J.B. BURY, HISTORY OF GREECE TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT
(1951); M. CARY, HISTORY OF ROME DOWN TO THE REIGN OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT (2d
ed. 1954); V.G. CHILDE, THE DAWN OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION (6th ed. 1958); C.N.
LOCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE (1944); C. DAWSON, THE MAKING OF EU-
ROPE (1932); J.H. FINLEY, JR., FOUR STAGES OF GREEK THOUGHT (1966); C.F.C. HAWKES,
THE PREHISTORIC FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPE TO THE MYCENEAN AGE (1940); H.M.
McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF THE TYPOGRAPHIC MAN (1962); W.H.
McNEIL, A WORLD HISTORY (2d ed. 1971); W.H. McNEIL, THE RISE OF THE WEST (1963);
G. MURRAY, HELLENISM AND THE MODERN WORLD (1953); S.F. NADEL, A BLACK BYZANTIUM
(1942); R.R. PALMER & J. COTTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD (2d ed. 1956); H.
TREVOR-ROPER, THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN EUROPE (1965).
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mology in which there existed a reciprocal interaction between
heaven, earth, and men. The earthly affairs revolved around the
emperor just as the heavens turned on the pole star. The em-
peror was responsible both for war and politics as well as for the
terrestrial phenomena that affected human activity, such as
weather. It was the emperor's duty to follow the prescribed rites
in order to obtain harmony between earth and heaven which
would advance human welfare. However, the fact that wars hap-
pened brought into question the belief that correct observance
of traditional rites would bring order and prosperity. Conse-
quently, the Legalists rose in prominence. They repudiated the
pieties of the past. Ultimately, however, it was the conservative
piety of the sage Confucius (551-479 B.C.), which prevailed.
Confucius rejected Heaven and spirits as proper objects of
inquiry, although he accepted their reality and power. Instead,
he directed attention to the human aspects of things. His disci-
ples recorded his sayings about what a wise man should do.
These were compiled during his lifetime in the Five Classics.
The study of the Classics became essential for a well-educated
man. The Classics thus provided a common core to the suc-
ceeding generations from which grew fundamental attitudes and
values which held the Chinese civilization together all the way
down to the twentieth century. Confucianism emphasized deco-
rum and self-control. Other schools, especially the contemporary
Taoism, emphasized human passion and mysteries of nature.
Together, interacting mutually, they provided a stable pattern of
thought which remained fundamentally uninterrupted, although
enriched with later changes, and which provided the cement of
civilization up to the modern times.
During the period 500 B.C. to 200 A.D., the ruler of the
state of Chi'n crushed the Steppe barbarians and overthrew his
rivals within China, so that he became, in 221 B.C., the First
Emperor (Shih Huang-ti) of the new Chi'n dynasty. He opted
for the Legalist school and repudiated Confucianism, since it
compelled the emperor to govern according to the traditional
rites. However, Confucianism was soon reinstated by the emper-
ors of the subsequent Han dynasty (202 B.C.-200 A.D.), and the
rival doctrines were suppressed. Under the Confucianist teach-
ings, the educated classes cultivated a remarkably uniform out-
look. During the period 200 to 600 A.D., the imperial China was
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reconstituted and bureaucracy was organized by the Sui emper-
ors, but this was done without disturbing Confucianism as the
principle of social organization.
During the period 600 to 1000 A.D., although the strong
central power was disrupted in 755 A.D., the economic develop-
ment continued undisturbed and the landlord-official class con-
tinued in their traditional dominance. Their members were edu-
cated in the Classics. They pursued decorum worthy of
gentlemen. The gentlemanly idea was further elaborated during
the T'ang (618-907 A.D.), and Sung (960-1279 A.D.), periods. In
the early T'ang period, Buddhism practically achieved an official
status but the Confucianists distrusted it and, after 845 A.D.,
they persecuted it systematically. Nevertheless, the Con-
fucianists learned from it how to read new meanings in the Clas-
sics and the Taoists took from it doctrine as well as monastic
organization and schooling. The net result was a Neo-Confucian-
ism whose pre-eminence was assured by the policy of the Sung
rulers to preserve things authentically Chinese.
During the period 1000 to 1500 A.D., the later Sung extolled
the Neo-Confucianism even further. In the Ming period (1368-
1644 A.D.), China first embarked upon its maritime enterprise
but, after the expeditions of the court eunuch Cheng-ho (1405-
1433 A.D.), the Ming Emperor forbade sea-going. The Ming re-
stored the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. This meant suffering for
the mercantile class. The trading community, however, lost its
importance due to the remarkably outstanding productivity of
agriculture. Consequently, the conservative Confucianism came
to prevail. Its institutions achieved such perfection and inner
strength that no upheaval could do more than make a transitory
impression. These institutions continued to provide the social
organization for the society until the massive social break-down
of China in the twentieth century.
During the period 1500 to 1700, the Manchus founded their
Ch'ing dynasty. They had originated from a barbarian warband
of Manchuria and they distrusted the native Chinese. However,
the civil administration employed both the Chinese and the
Manchus and, even more importantly, it used recruitment exam-
inations based on the knowledge of the Confucian classics. The
restoration of peace brought prosperity. The inner balance of
the Chinese culture had achieved such perfection that they took
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no more than a casual notice of the novelties brought by the
Europeans, such as new geographical information, improved as-
tronomical skills, pendulum clocks, and the Jesuits. They devel-
oped critical methods to discover true meanings of the old Con-
fucian texts. The rigorous Han School of Learning discouraged
wayward interpretations such as were indulged into by the ear-
lier Neo-Confucianists.
During the period 1700 to 1850, dynastic decay began.
Revolts followed revolts, culminating into the disastrous Taiping
Rebellion of 1850. Additional problems were brought by the Eu-
ropean trade. The British abolished the China trade monopoly
of the East India Company and introduced European patterns of
commerce at Canton. The Chinese officials forbade the import of
opium, but the British and the European traders took to extra-
legal forms of trade in this substance. The British gunboats
shattered the Chinese coastal defenses in a war and extracted
the Treaty of Nanking (1842), where under they obtained all
they wanted. Other European powers followed the pattern. In
spite of such dislocations, however, the traditional way of life
continued uninterrupted until after 1850.
During the period 1850 to 1945, the European adventurers
flooded the treaty ports following the opium war of 1839 to 1841.
Backed by guns and diplomacy of their respective governments,
they refused, in the Confucian tradition, to remain in their hum-
ble position assigned to foreign merchants. The Chinese, on
their part, could not bring themselves to abandon the Confucian
ways in order to deal with the European powers. Their territo-
ries were snatched part by part by England, France, Russia, and
Japan, and they continually ceded concessions, control, and
privileges to the foreigners. Many Chinese saw this as a betrayal
by their government. Secret societies sprouted for overthrowing
the Manchus. The Boxers attacked the hated foreigners, but the
European powers occupied Peking (1900) and extracted an in-
demnity. In 1911 revolutionaries rose against the discredited
Manchus. In 1912 they installed a republic. New kinds of ideas
began attracting the educated class.
Legalism reappeared. Western-style codes were adopted in
order to beat Western domination. However, in spite of this
Western-style legalistic activity, traditional concepts persisted.
The codes were followed when compatible with the traditional
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ideas of equity and propriety. They were ignored when they con-
flicted with the tradition. However, Confucianism was aban-
doned by such intellectual and political leaders as Sun Yat-Sen
(d. 1925) and his Kuomintang Party. Chiang Kai-shek of Kuo-
mintang and Mao Tse-tung of the Communists clashed at the
end of the Japanese occupation in 1945. The Communists
emerged with victory in 1949. The Soviet model of Socialist le-
gality was established in the country. It was adopted in the Con-
stitution of 1954, in spite of attacks made in 1952 to 1953 on
such concepts of Western legalism as separation of law from
politics, equality before law, independence of the judiciary, limi-
tations of actions, and non-retroactivity of legislation. However,
relations with the Soviet Union ruptured in 1960, with the sig-
nificant consequence that the Soviet model was dropped and a
return took place to China's own system of values. In that sys-
tem priority was given to social transformation over economic
growth, persuasion was emphasized over force, the adversary was
treated not beyond redemption, and self-criticism was adopted
over assertion of rights.
China has thus reverted to its ancient traditions. There are,
of course important variations, namely: one, the cosmology of
natural phenomenon and human behavior is no longer accepted;
two, the earlier methods of mediation (i.e., appeal to the family,
the clan, the neighbors, or the local dignitaries) have been re-
placed by mediation of politically involved bodies, such as the
people's mediation committees, of which there are well over
200,000 in the country; and, three, the view that each party in a
dispute must sacrifice something of his own for re-establishing
harmony has been supplemented by the need to assure success
of some policy. In any case, legalism is clearly repudiated in
favor of education and persuasion and the honorable course is
conciliation, not recourse to law and assertion of individual
rights. Law is meant for dealing with the morally perverse, the
incorrigible criminal, the counter-revolutionary for whom reform
is hopeless, and the foreigner who is alien to the Chinese values.
There is a legend in China that Fa (law) was invented by
the barbarian tribe of Miao in the twenty-third century B.C. in
the time of prophet Shun whom God later exterminated. Con-
flict resolution is sought, for most part, by appeal to conscience
and not by pursuing rights in the courts of law. Resort must first
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be made to Ch'ing (human sentiment), next to Lii' (reason), and
only lastly to Fa. Thus, the definition of Chinese axiology is pro-
vided not by individualism and legalism but by the modified
Confucianist traditions.2
C. The Japanese Civilization: Similarly, individualism and
legalism are not the central values of the Japanese axiology, ei-
ther. The Japanese, in the beginning of their civilization, raised
their agriculture steadily to the level of the Chinese. During the
period 600 to 1000 A.D., they adopted Buddhism, Confucianism,
and other features of the Chinese culture. The emperors of the
Nara Period (645-784 A.D.), copied the T'ang court of China,
while the barons of the provinces pursued a more rough style.
The Taika era (beginning 646 A.D.), introduced a system of pe-
riodic distribution of rice plantations. The society was classified
into ranks which were assigned particular tasks for the regime.
The compilation of ritsu-ryo enumerated the duties of each
class. They laid down prohibitions (ritsu) and the administrative
rules (ryo). However, these compilations were not a catalog of
legal rights and duties but, rather, a source of enlightenment for
the people. The system of sharing public land was replaced by a
feudal system in the ninth and tenth centuries. The key institu-
tion of that system was the seigneurial unit of sho, which was a
sovereign domain with fiscal privileges, whose master owned all
its land.
During the period 1000 to 1500 A.D., the warrior barons
(samurai) developed their own warrior ideal whose essential ele-
ments were courage in battle, loyalty to the leader, and personal
32 See generally, D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967); TRADI-
TIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA (Buxbaum 1967); CHU
CHENG, ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINESE SYSTEM OF LAW (1947); T. CHIN, LAW
AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of
Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 120 (1966); H.G. CREEL, THE BIRTH OF CHINA (1936); R.
DAVID & J.H.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (2d ed. 1978);
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION (DeBary 1960); J. ESCARRA, CHINESE LAW: CONCEPTION
AND EVOLUTION, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, SCIENCE AND TEACHING (Browne
trans. 1961); J. GERNET, ANCIENT CHINA FROM BEGINNING TO THE EMPIRE (1968); J.
GERNET, LE MONDE CHINOIS (1972); S. LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1967); LI CHI,
THE BEGINNING OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1957); V. Li, The Role of Law in Communist
China, 44 CHINA Q. 66 (1970); M.A. MACCIOCHI, DAILY LIFE IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA
(1972); McAleavy, Chinese Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 115 (Derret
1968); W.H. McNEIL, A WORLD HISTORY (2d ed. 1971); Tsien, La responsibilite civile
delictuelle en Chine populaire, 1967 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 875.
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dignity of the fighting man. Disputes among different bands
were settled by the sword. The substance and the power of the
emperor and the courtier class (kuge) declined. The warrior class
(buke, bushi, samurai) developed its own code of conduct (buke-
ho). Its basis was the duty of faithfulness to the overlord, not to
any Western-style concept of law. Buke-ho applied to the war-
rior class, ritsu-ryo to others; a dualism that subsisted until the
period of the Ashizaka Shoguns (1333-1573), when buke-ho be-
came predominant as the superiority of the warrior was estab-
lished over the peasant. The landless samurai took to sea-roving
and piracy. The riches brought from the sea promoted a town
life and a self-reliant middle class which developed a high cul-
ture based on the samurai traditions. The Chinese-import Zen
Buddhism mingled with the samurai ideal to produce the Pure
Land Buddhism that had already begun around 1200 A.D. Its
monasteries were often important landholders which defended
themselves like a samurai clan, crushing peasant uprisings that
began occurring after 1400.
Until 1400, the cult of Sun Goddess was confined to the im-
perial court. It was now reinterpreted, acquiring its own meta-
physics and theology under the name of Shinto. The period 1500
to 1700 began with civil wars and arrival of the Europeans, pri-
marily the Portuguese, bringing Christian baptism and Euro-
pean guns. The cost of armaments soared. That created the need
for large territorial sovereigns, so that political consolidation of
Japan began with Hideyoshi (d. 1598) and was continued by the
Tokugawa Shoguns (1603-1868).
The consequence of the end of warfare was that the samu-
rai were now left with no meaningful occupation. They busied
themselves with promoting the vulgar culture of the towns. That
culture existed alongside the decorous culture of the officialdom.
The social order proceeded on the basis of a strict separation of
the social classes, which were the warriors, the peasants, and the
merchants. The aesthetic samurai life-style and the lascivious
urban life-style continued in their duality during the period
1700 to 1850.
Neo-Confucianism was made official by the Tokugawa
Shoguns, who suppressed other doctrines. The disaffected Japa-
nese denied both Western as well as Chinese thoughts, and used
the Neo-Confucianist teaching of obedience to oppose the
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Shoguns' usurpation of the Emperor's authority. They practiced
Shintoism, instead of Neo-Confucianism. The ideas of individu-
alism and legalism were totally absent in these developments.
The giri, or the proper rules of behavior, provided the basis for
the social order. They were followed because violation brought
social reprobation. The giri were various. There were the giri of
father and son, husband and wife, landowner and farmer, lender
and borrower, merchant and customer, employer and employee,
and so on.
During the period 1850 to 1945, the Western navies pre-
vailed over the Japanese policy of rigorous seclusion and, in
1845, the Tokugawa Shogun had to accept the American terms
of opening the Japanese ports to them for travel and coaling sta-
tions. The humiliation was immense. It resulted in the over-
throw of the Tokugawa government in 1868. The Emperor was
restored, inaugurating the Meiji era. The Japanese soon realized
that they must adopt Western technology and Western political
organization if they were to protect themselves from the West.
As a result, a democratic State replaced the feudalism. Western-
style laws were enacted. Public institutions were modified by es-
tablishing freedom of agriculture in 1871, sale of land in 1872,
and a Constitution in 1889. The administrative structure of the
country was reorganized along the lines of departments (kin)
and municipalities. The industrial revolution was launched.
However, it is to be noted that the traditional ways contin-
ued in all the three fields of industry, human-relations, and
politics. In the industrial field, the samurai traditions were
adopted in that: (i) the factory managers served the nation,
obeyed the superiors, and disciplined and protected the inferi-
ors; (ii) the firms took honor and prestige as their goal; and (iii)
the private venturers pursued the old warrior virtues of courage,
endurance, and loyalty. In the field of human relations, the sam-
urai traditions were followed in that the managers commanded
and the workers obeyed and were taken care of throughout their
life. In the political field, important authority was exercised be-
hind the scenes by an inner circle of elders descending from the
clique of class leaders, inspite of the fact that the Constitution
of 1889 introduced universal male suffrage to the Diet.
The modern times begin with the surrender to the United
States in August 1945 at the end of World War II. Today, the
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Western-style law governs a very small portion of social life
comprising the middle class individuals fashion their relations
on the basis of freedom and liberty. The majority of the people
follow the Confucian idea of hierarchy based on natural order.
Personal relations are carried on along the lines of giri-ninjo,
not law. The notion of legal rights is looked down upon since it
depersonalizes human relations by treating all persons on an
equal basis. Law is deemed appropriate only for depersonalized
matters of business and industry. Conciliation procedures of
jidan, wakai, and chotei are preferred for dispute settlement.
Under jidan, the parties settle the dispute amicably through
mediators. Under wakai, the judge brings the parties to a settle-
ment. Under chotei, the parties request the court to appoint a
panel of conciliators charged with preparing an equitable settle-
ment. Arbitration (chusai) is avoided in domestic contracts, al-
though, of course, used in foreign trade contracts. Thus, Japan's
value system is constituted of its own traditional values and not
individualism and legalism."3
D. The Indian Civilization: The axiology of the Indian civi-
lization is unique, yet, it is not composed of individualism and
legalism. Civilization began in the Indus valley shortly after 3500
to 3000 B.C., and the Aryans invaded the Indus cities by about
1500 B.C. The Ganges valley was on its way to civilized complex-
ity by 800 B.C. In this civilization it was caste that emerged as
the principle of social organization which, with subsequent mod-
ifications, continues to this day. A caste is an exclusive group of
persons for intimacies of dining and intermarriage and it has
definite rules of how to behave with members of other castes.
Strangers, intruders, wanderers, and displaced persons become
another caste. New occupations create new castes. A large caste
is divided into sub-castes.
33 See generally, G.M. BECKMAN, THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA AND JAPAN (1962);
CR. BOXER, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY IN JAPAN 1549-650 (1951); H. BOSTON, JAPAN'S MOD-
ERN HISTORY (1955); TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA
(Buxbaum 1967); R. DAVID & J.H.C BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD To-
DAY (1978); D.F. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN
(1964); F. JOUON DES LONGRAIS, L'EST ET L'OUEST, INSTITUTIONS DU JAPON ET DE
L'OCCIDENT EUROPEEN. SIX PTUDES DE SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE (1958); W.H. McNEIL, WORLD
HISTORY (1971); Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT JAPONAIS (1966); A. VON MEHREN, LAW
IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1963).
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The system follows three main principles, namely: (i) cere-
monial purity, (ii) pyramidical structure, and (iii) Varna and re-
incarnation. There is in it the idea of ceremonial purity with its
concomitant fear of contamination by a member of a lower class.
The castes are arranged in a pyramidical structure in which each
caste has another to look down upon. This yields a psychological
satisfaction which is significant for social organization in that
there is, thus, no need to compel the newcomers to surrender
their ways and be assimilated into the population as a whole.
The doctrines of Varna and reincarnation are followed. Varna
divides all people in four large castes in the decending order,
namely, Brahmans who pray and perform rituals, Kshatriyas
who fight wars and defend the society, Vaisyas who carry on
trade, and Sudras who perform unclean tasks. Reincarnation
gives a logical explanation of a man's situation in terms of re-
ward or punishment for deeds done in the former lives of the
soul. Thus, the foremost identification of a person was with his
caste. Consequently, the political and territorial administration
was of only secondary importance.
Caste also made it easy for newcomers to come within the
fold of the Indian civilization without radical displacement of
their own customs and habits. In about 500 B.C., Jainism and
Buddhism emerged to challenge the Brahman priests. However,
while Jainism became a faith for the elite, the more popular
Buddhism ultimately gave way to a transformed Brahmanical
religion, namely, Hinduism. The Dharma Sutras, or the Hindu
manuals of conduct, were composed between the sixth and the
second centuries B.C. During the period 500 B.C. to 200 A.D.,
when the kingdom of Magadha consolidated itself, Emperor
Asoka (reigned 274-36 B.C.) gave official patronage to Bud-
dhism. However, although the monks found in it a complete way
of life, the ordinary people resorted to Brahmans for the daily
rites of their lives. In the period 200 to 600 A.D., the Gupta em-
pire (320-535 A.D.) extended over all of northern India, and the
Dharma Shastras, or instructions in the sacred law, were com-
piled, which with subsequent interpretations to meet contempo-
rary needs, have provided the basis for Hindu life ever since.
The Dharma Shastras gave the theory of caste its classical for-
mulation and laid down duties of the members of different
castes. Faithful performance of these duties would lead to the
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salvation of the soul, the salvation consisting in the freeing of
the soul from the cycle of reincarnation and uniting itself with
the Absolute Soul or God. During the period 600 to 1000 A.D.,
the Muslims invaded India but the caste organization of the
Hindu society kept it politically and militarily weak so that the
Hindus were unable to repel the invaders and they peaceably
recoiled to conserving their heritage.
Inspite of movements for integration, the popular Hinduism
remained firmly rooted. During the period 1000 to 1500 A.D.,
the Muslim conquest of India was decisively completed. The
Hindus put their conquerors into another caste-like class and
thus fitted them into their social system. Islam resisted the caste
system. The itinerant Sufi men preached the egalitarian teach-
ings of Islam, which appealed to the low-caste urban Hindus and
to the newcomers to the Indian society along the frontiers, espe-
cially in eastern Bengal, who had been put in the lower caste.
However, due to the destruction of the Hindu temples by the
Muslim invaders, Hinduism took to the street, so that only the
fringes of the society were attracted to Islam. Movements such
as the Sikh faith attempted a synthesis of the two religions.
During the period 1500 to 1700, the Muslim rulers conquered
the last independent Hindu state of Vijayanagar in the south
(1565), and during the reign of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb
(1658-1707), Hinduism was deprived of State support. But it was
revitalized in the streets by saints and poets; the excitement
generated by these movements prevailed over the arguments of
the Muslim and the Christian missionaries. Consequently, the
overwhelming majority of Indians remained true to the Hindu
faith, traditions, and ways of life, including the caste system of
social organization. Muslim law was linked to Islam. Therefore,
it applied to Muslims but not to non-Muslims, except, of course,
in criminal matters.
During the period 1700 to 1850, the Mughal power declined
with the revolts of the Marathas and the Sikhs. The European
trading companies began equipping their own armed forces.
Eventually, the British succeeded in controlling all of India, with
no military rivals. They left the social institutions and relation-
ships of the natives alone. The British and the Hindu reformists
pioneered initiatives for increased interaction between the West-
ern and the Hindu cultures but the great majority of the popula-
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tion remained only vaguely aware of such developments.
During the period 1850 to 1945, the British were faced with
the revolt of 1857 which they were able to crush. Thereafter,
they established an autocratic civil service which was recruited
from British universities and which began imposing a long series
of reforms. The reaction of the Indians to Western civilization
was peaceful and consistent with their tradition. Accordingly,
new ventures of industry and commerce were largely left to the
outsiders, such as the Parsis and the Englishmen. The industries
were initiated during the two World Wars as a result of neces-
sity caused by the disruption of supply lines from England.
During the British rule, the Hindu sacred law of Dharma
was applied to such matters as marriage, inheritance, the caste
system, and religious usages or institutions. Other aspects of
civil administration were governed by a newly created territorial
law. English courts were established. They applied Hindu law to
the Hindus and Muslim law to the Muslims in matters of inheri-
tance, marriage, caste, and religious usages or institutions. They
applied general principles of justice, equity, and good conscience
in other matters.
Although the Cornwallis Code of 1793 and the Elphinstone
Code of 1827 had already been adopted for India in criminal
matters, organized codification began with the Charter Act of
1833. The first Law Commission submitted its famous lex loci
report which proposed three codes: one for the Muslim law, one
for the Hindu law, and one in the nature of territorial law (lex
loci) for matters where Hindu or Muslim law was not applicable.
Serious objections were raised against these proposals. A second
Law Commission, established in 1853, made its own proposals. It
was only after the revolt of 1857 that an intensive legislative ac-
tivity for India took place. The Indian National Congress was
organized in 1885 with the aim of achieving self-government. Af-
ter World War I, its leadership passed to Mahatma Gandhi. The
Muslim League was organized in 1905 which, in 1940, pro-
claimed its goal of establishing a separate Muslim State of Paki-
stan. Independence from the British rule came in 1947, when
India was divided into Muslim Pakistan and a secular India. Af-
ter independence, the Constitution of 1950 provided for the con-
tinuity of the existing law (§ 372). New legal activity followed.
The modern tendency is for a secular law to replace the religious
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laws. However, nearly eighty percent of the population lives in
villages and continues to conduct its life through the traditional
institutions.
Thus, while India as a political unit has a highly developed
legal system, legalism and individualism are not the staple val-
ues of a great majority of people in India who continue to live in
accordance with the values of the caste system and the joint-
Hindu-family system.3
E. The African Cultures: A study of the various cultures of
the African peoples, namely: the Tallensi, Ashanti, Hausa-Fu-
lani, Yoruba, Ibo, Tiv, Ganda, Lugbara, Kikuyu, Nandi, Arusha,
Nyakyusa and the Nuer, as well as an examination of the gen-
eral cultural history of Africa leads us to the conclusion that
these peoples have their own value systems whose central fea-
tures are not individualism and legalism."
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peoples within the space of this article, but I shall illustrate our
point with three examples, namely, the Ashanti, Yoruba, and
Nandi cultures.
For the Ashanti people, the spiritual world is supreme.
They adopt a particular form of social order because it is the
appropriate mode of linkage with the spiritual world. The action
in the tribe and the nation is organized by the means of the fam-
ily or the lineage. The lineage, the tribe, and the nation re-
present particular spheres of competence, rather than a struc-
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ture of hierarchical authority. The concept of ntoro provides the
bond with the spiritual world and the concept of mogya provides
the bond with the world of the flesh. The mogya makes the child
member of its lineage, which is a group descending from a com-
mon original female ancestor. The lineage group forms a part of
the clan. The clan is composed of matrilineal descendants from
a common female ancestor. The lineage head, or the elder, is
elected by the senior members of the lineage. His functions in-
clude, among others, deciding disputes among the lineage mem-
bers. The tribe is composed of various clans. The Asantehene, or
the Ashanti chief is entrusted with the performance of rituals to
propitiate the spirits and the gods, and to lead his tribe in war.
These various units of society are assigned specific competence
by tradition and they are called to action when appropriate.
The individual is placed both in the world of his ancestors
as well as in the world of his family and clan. Life is a matter of
performance of obligations. Thus, land is held with the obliga-
tion to use it. Property is held with the obligation to employ it
for the benefit of those sharing one's blood. The obligations of
the Ashanti male are to till the land, render services to those
who have a link with the spiritual world, serve the Asantehene
in war, assist in performing rituals, pay levies duly imposed,
raise the offspring, and so on. The norms to protect the social
order and avoid injury to gods are laid down by tradition. Viola-
tion results in inquiry into the family, the tribe, and the nation.
Tribal offenses call for severe sanctions because of the great risk
of injury to the tribe through displeased gods.
The Yoruba people live in three types of settlement pat-
terns: (i) a central town surrounded by farm lands and hamlets,
with subordinate towns at the periphery of the kingdom; (ii) nu-
merous independent villages beyond the central town and its
short belt of farm lands; and, (iii) central townspeopled largely
by refugees, surrounded by farm land, with no subordinate
towns, and with widely spread hamlets. The oba, or the king,
lives in metropolitan towns. The smallest group is the domestic
family of the man. This family is part of a larger group com-
posed of descendents of a common male ancestor, which, in turn,
is part of the idile or the ebi, that being the largest lineage
group of all who descended from a founding male ancestor.
There are intermediate patrilineal segments in the idile known
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as isoko. The isoko members cultivate the lineage land allotted
to them, pursue a lineage craft, and jointly worship ancestors
and gods. Ifa, the god of divination, has the power of ameliorat-
ing the harmful effects of the supernatural if the social norms
are respected. The reports of Eshu, the messenger of gods, result
into punishment which could be averted by proper behavior. Of-
fenses and punishment are defined by custom. Decisions con-
cerning the use and allocation of land among the members of the
family, the community, and the kingdoms are made by the head
of the lineage, the chief, and the oba, respectively.
The Nandi people live in scattered homesteads organized
into groupings called korotinwek (singular, koret) and the koret
members are identified by territorial location, not by lineage re-
lationship. The tiliet, or the relationship system, identifies the
interrelationships of persons united by blood and marriage. The
kokwet (plural, kokwotinek), or the council of elders, governs
the koret. It is headed by the poiyot ap kokwet, or the elder of
the council, and its decisions are obeyed because of: (a) the force
of public disapproval for non-compliance, (b) the fear of the
power of the spirits, and (c) private acknowledgement of guilt by
the offender. A general standard of approved behavior is laid
down by karuret, or custom. The living, the ancestral spirits,
and the supreme god Asis are joined together to reinforce moral
standards.
Thus, the examples of the Ashanti, the Yoruba, and the
Nandi cultures illustrate our point that legalism and individual-
ism are not part of the value systems of the peoples of Africa.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Africa began ex-
periencing powerful changes as the Muslims surged upon it from
the north and the east and the Europeans from the west and the
south. Vigorous state-building occurred as a result of three fac-
tors, namely: one, a substantial increase in food production
which supported larger populations; two, suppression of the
slave trade; and, three, increase in demand for African products,
such as ivory and palm oil. Guns destroyed the older military
systems, such as those of the spear-wielding Zulus of Natal or
the armored horsemen of Bornu. The Muslim movement and the
Christian missionaries further contributed to the changes.
Through the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the
rulers in much of east and west Africa extended their power
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with the help of the Muslim ideas of law, as, for example, the
Ashanti kingdom. However, these ideas did not displace the tra-
ditions and customs of the land in the villages. The Muslim
movements often came in conflict with the European Christians.
The Christian missionaries brought schools, hospitals, and
knowledge of Western civilization. However, the Europeaniza-
tion of the sub-Saharan Africa remained insignificant, except in
Algeria in the north and the Boer Republic in the south. The
interior was still controlled by the ancient kingdoms, such as the
Kingdom of Bornu near Lake Chad, or by the new regimes, such
as that of the Zulu founded in 1817, by Shaka (1787-1828). How-
ever, between 1875 and 1914, the European colonial administra-
tions grew rapidly and the Africans were defeated in all their
wars against the colonizing powers, except for Ethiopia, whose
Emperor Menelik II defeated Italy in 1896. Inspite of their polit-
ical subjugation, however, the social structures of the African so-
cieties continued in their traditional ways.
During World War I (1914-1918), the German colonies were
easily taken over by the British and the French without causing
much disruption. During the inter-war period, rebellions were
minimal. The result of the exposure of the Africans to the Euro-
pean experience was the movement of hundreds of thousands of
people to an environment in which old customs did not fit as
peoples of different tribes began living together in mission
schools, mines, and towns. Old kinships and tribal patterns
could not provide a basis for mutual accommodation. The other
possibilities were the Islamic and the Western models. While the
Islamic model prevailed in parts where it had been established
for many centuries, the Western model competed strongly with
the Islamic model in most of sub-Saharan regions. Independence
came after the end of World War II. Since then, the new nations
of Africa have demonstrated a tendency for modernization along
the European principles and new legislation has been adopted to
change the traditional ways. However, despite this moderniza-
tion, eighty to ninety percent of the population continues to live
by traditions and customs and not by individualism and legal-
ism. They are generally unaffected by the reform legislation and
are largely unaware of the laws and institutions of the cities.
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F. The Islamic Civilization: The core of the Islamic axiology
is duties, not individualistic rights. Muslim societies are many
and they differ in their social conditions, traditions, and perva-
siveness of Islam. These societies may be classified in three
types: one, those, such as Albania and the central Asian socialist
republics, which make no attempt to preserve the Muslim con-
cepts of social order and personal values; two, those, such as
Iran, Afganistan, the Persian Gulf Emirates, or the countries of
the Arabian peninsula, which maintain a very stong adherence
to these concepts; and three, those, such as India, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Pakistan, and the like, which apply the Islamic
precepts in conjunction with modern concepts.
Regardless of this variety among Muslim societies, the es-
sentials of the Islamic theory are36 that Islam is the direct rule
of Allah and His law, the Sharia, is the only criterion of con-
duct. The authority of the temporal ruler is not only derived
from Sharia but is subservient to it as well. Islamic law consists
of a system of religious duties, although there are in it such legal
relationships as are distinguishable from purely religious duties.
There are five qualifications (al ahkam al khamsa) through
which all acts and relationships are viewed: (1) obligatory
(wajib, fard); (2) recommended (mandub, mustahabb); (3) indif-
ferent (mubah); (4) reprehensible or disapproved (makruh); and
(5) forbidden (haram).
An act is valid (sahih), disapproved (makruh), defective
(fasid), or invalid (batil). It is valid if both its nature (asl) and
its circumstances (wash correspond with Sharia, the law. It is
disapproved if it is associated with something forbidden, even
though it corresponds with the law in its nature and circum-
stances. It is defective if its nature corresponds with the law but
its circumstances do not. It is invalid if it does not correspond
with the law in both its nature and its circumstances.
Under the orthodox Sunni doctrine, both the ruler and the
subjects owe a common obedience to the law. It is the duty of
the Imam (the religious leader) to govern according to the
Sharia. The Shi'a sect regards the Imam infallible, whereas the
Kharijis make him subject to election and removal by the will of
36 See generally, J. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW (1964); N.J. COUL-
SON, HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
1989]
31
PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
the community. It is the duty of the judge, or the qadi, to settle
disputes by reconciliation of the parties rather than through as-
sertion of their rights. As a fallible human being, he must not be
too eager to define the law of Allah with certainty. Thus, it is
duty, not individualistic rights, which is the central value in the
Islamic concept of social order. That is why the essential institu-
tions of the State are construed not as functions of the commu-
nity but as duties of the individual. That is also why we do not
find in the Islamic law any legal concept that would correspond
to authority, dominion, or power of the ruler.
Thus, an examination of the above civilizations demonstrate
above that there exists a plurality of value systems in the world,
each grown in the particular historicity of its respective civiliza-
tion. Thus, while individualism and legalism are the fundamen-
tal values in the Western civilization, the Confucianist traditions
are in China, the Samurai traditions are in Japan, the caste and
the joint-family system are in India, the particular customs and
traditions of the African peoples are in Africa, and the Sharia
principles of duty are in the Islamic societies. However, as seen
above, although some of the provisions of the international bill
of human rights are not circumscribed within the axiology of in-
dividualism and legalism, the bill is predominantly based on this
axiology and it does not take an adequate account of the other
major value systems of the world.
Why did the bill adopt the single-catalog approach based
predominantly on the Western value system? I offer two expla-
nations. Firstly, there was an unfortunate insensitivity on the
part of the key drafters of the instruments of this bill which
made them ignore the value systems of civilizations other than
Western. Take, for example, the case of John P. Humphrey. He
was the author of the first draft of what eventually became the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He reveals in his auto-
biography that in 1947, the Chinese Vice-Chairman of the Com-
mission on Human Rights, P.C. Chang, requested him to study
Chinese philosophy before writing his draft. However,
Humphrey boasts that "I didn't go to China nor did I study the
writing of Confucius! ' 7 He then went on to preparing his draft.
" J.P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 29
(1984).
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This was a great pity.38 As fundamental an instrument as the
UDHR set out to prescribe human rights for all peoples of the
world but axiologically ended up ignoring most of them.
The second explanation for the single-catalog approach lies
in the attractiveness of the previously successful models,
namely, the English Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declara-
tion of Independence (1776), and the French Dclaration des
Droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen (1789). The attraction is un-
derstandable, since these documents had been remarkably suc-
cessful. However, the context of these documents was one single
society in the sense that: that society was held together by one
dominant culture that defined its values; it espoused one domi-
nant ideology; it regarded itself as one historical unit unifying its
historical experiences; it possessed one single economic system
managing the production and distribution of its goods; it enter-
tained but one prevailing notion of priorities in the satisfaction
of its needs; and it had one legal system to administer the rights
so declared. These subsumptions do not obtain for the context
of the present international bill of human rights. Quite to the
contrary, it is characterized by the tenacity of civilizational plu-
ralism, as shown above. Consequently, inspiring as the above
models are, their single-catalog approach is totally unsuitable for
providing protection to the human being on a world-wide scale.
It must, nevertheless, be emphasized that the bill makes a
valuable contribution in securing human rights in this multi-
civilizational world. Firstly, it does not merely represent exclu-
sively Western values. There is nothing exclusively Western
about the security of the person's life and liberty, protection
against torture, decent working conditions, adequate standard of
living, protection from hunger, or education. Secondly, the docu-
ments of the bill do give an eloquent expression to the values
issuing from the Western ethical and social systems wherein the
individual is regarded as the basic unit of society and wherein
legalism provides the dominant principle of his social organiza-
tion. This is a valuable contribution, since the Western civiliza-
tion has as much a claim to be included in a global scheme of
human rights as any other civilization. Thirdly, the discovery
88 Sinha, Book Review, INT'L J. LEGAL INFORM. 158 (1984) (reviewing J.P. HUMPHREY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE (1984).
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and perfection of the technique of mass production by the West-
ern societies in the last two hundred years represents an unprec-
edented achievement in the civilized history which has made
good life possible for the masses. Consequently, societies all over
the world are adopting the Western-style industrialization.
However, industrialization has also produced ills for human
existence, such as long working hours, child labor, and so on.
The Western societies have struggled with those ills in their own
experience and have come up with measures for protecting the
human being from those ills. The whole cluster of provisions in
the human-rights documents concerning work and the workplace
represent these measures. They articulate the fruits of Western
learning in this respect which have usefulness for all societies
engaged in industrialization.
However, the single-catalog approach of the bill results in
several undesirable consequences. Firstly, such an approach nec-
essarily seeks universals among all cultures. The result is a least
common denominator which dilutes the human rights to the
minimal of commonality, thereby ignoring the deeper dynamics
that exist variously in the inner folds of various cultures with
respect to the matters of these rights. Secondly, the universality
of many concepts claimed in this approach is fake. For example,
the meaning of inhumane treatment is not the same in all cul-
tures. Or, even such a basic concept as life has a different mean-
ing in those cultures which see it in the foetus from those which
see it only after delivery. Thirdly, this approach can only adopt
one model of human emancipation. It dismisses others which,
too, seek the physical and spiritual security of the human being
but on the basis of other values. A sound approach must allow
various cultures to follow their own respective models. My critics
on this point39 have fallen prey to the fallacy of identifying the
culture of a society with the government of the State. Each cul-
ture has its own values, ideals, and models for human emancipa-
tion and the government must be made accountable for those
values rather than for values which are alien to the people whom
it governs. Fourthly, some specific human rights resulting from
this approach employing Western axiology possesses no meaning
"' Contra Fryer, Contemplating Sinha's Anthropocentric Theory of International
Law as a Basis for Human Rights, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 575, 585-86 (1980).
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for other cultures. For example, Article 16(2) of the UDHR, Ar-
ticle 10(1) of the ICESCR, and Article 23(3) of the ICCPR re-
quire that marriages be entered into by the consent of the in-
tending spouses. This makes very good sense in Western
societies where young men and women socially mix with each
other, select their own marital partners, and enter into marriage
in this way. But this is meaningless as a general rule in societies,
such as the village India, where that sort of social pattern is not
only not followed but is held in contempt and where the normal
means of marriage are for the families to seek the bride and
groom and arrange the marriage. Fifthly, the present bill is not
sufficiently sensitive to the human-rights problems of non-West-
ern cultures. It sometimes totally ignores some very grave ills.
For example, in marriages among the Hindus of India the family
of the bride is obliged to pay an onerous dowry, often beyond its
means, to the family of the bridegroom. This brings many mis-
eries. However, the documents of the bill have nothing to say
about it at all. Finally, the present approach results in a dogma-
tism in which accommodation of opposite values is not possible,
with the unfortunate consequence that sometimes a value is to-
tally abandoned. This point is poignantly illustrated by the
treatment of the right to own property. Article 17(1) of the
UDHR provides that everyone has the right to own property.
This clearly is a very important human right in the capitalistic-
private-enterprise societies but quite repugnant in socialist-com-
munist societies. As a result of objections by the communist
States, the provision was completely dropped from the Cove-
nants. That deletion is as wrong for the private-ownership socie-
ties as its inclusion for the communist societies. The present sin-
gle-catalog approach is unable to deal with the situation
satisfactorily.
Our investigation cannot be complete without making in-
quiry of whether the actual practice of the Human Rights Com-
mittee has overcome the axiological deficiency of the bill by ap-
plying different value systems for cases coming from different
civilizations respectively. The Human Rights Committee was es-
tablished on September 20, 1976, in accordance with Article 28
of the ICCPR. Its tasks (Articles 40-45) are to study reports on
the measures adopted by party States for effectuating the
human rights and on the progress made in the enjoyment of
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these rights; to transmit its reports and comments to party
States; to perform certain functions for settling disputes among
party states concerning the application of the Covenant; and, to
establish an ad hoc conciliation commission to make available its
good offices to party States involved in a dispute concerning the
application of the Covenant.
Under Article 41, a State may recognize the competence of
the Committee to receive and consider communications concern-
ing violations of its obligations alleged by another State. Under
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Committee may con-
sider communications received from individuals of a State which
has recognized the competence of the Committee to do so. The
Committee has recently published a report of its Selected Deci-
sions covering its second to sixteenth sessions, which correspond
to the reports it submitted to the thirty-second through thirty-
seventh sessions of the U.N. General Assembly (1977-1982).40
Although all of the annual reports of the Committee are pub-
lished as Supplement No. 40 of the Official Records of the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Selected Decisions is a fair sample for our
purposes. The States involved in these decisions have been Can-
ada, Colombia, Finland, Mauritius, Sweden, and Uruquay. Thus,
the only case involving a non-Western State has been S.
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius.4' Obviously, therefore, the
Committee has not had a sufficient number of cases from various
non-Western civilizations in which to fill the axiological gap left
by the ICCPR. Moreover, neither the issues raised in this partic-
ular case by the alleged victims and the government of Mauri-
tius were focused upon the axiological question, nor did the
Committee feel compelled on its own to seize in this case involv-
ing immigration and deportation laws an opportunity for provid-
ing an axiological corrective to the ICCPR. One, therefore, can-
not say that the practice of the Committee has rectified the
axiological deficiency of the Covenant.
It is sometimes suggested that the regional systems of
to See supra note 20. See also, Meron, Book Review, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 267(1986)
(reviewing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Commit-
tee: Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (Second to Sixteenth Sessions), U.N.
DOC. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985)).
4 See Selected Decisions, supra note 20, at Comm. No. 35/1978.
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human rights have filled this axiological gap. For example, in
adopting my study on The Missing First Step in the Human
Rights Movement,"2 the Committee on Human Rights of the
American Branch of the International Law Association"' noted
that certain of its members felt that "the impressive develop-
ment of regional protection of human rights evidences growing
concurrence in the scope and content of human rights notwith-
standing cultural and other divergencies.""" We must examine
this argument closely.
It probably makes two points. In the first place, it is looking
toward a civilizational uniformity which would guarantee human
rights in this world through a concurrence notwithstanding cul-
tural divergencies. However, this is not isomorphic to our world.
I have, above, pointed out the tenacity with which civilizational
pluralism has existed throughout civilized history and continues
to do so. While there are certain aspects of human existence in
which cultural concurrence exists, such as, for example, protec-
tion of person from physical violence, there are major areas of
personal and social relationships where different civilizations
practice their own particular historically developed value sys-
tems. Moreover, even in matters where an apparent concurrence
might exist on the surface, its uselessness is exposed when we
consider the specifics of the value involved, which is practiced
variously in different cultures. For example, as pointed out
above, one might argue a cultural concurrence on a right to life,
but this is of no assistance when we are faced with the problem
of abortion in a culture which considers that life begins with the
fetus or a culture which sees the human being only after birth.
Or, one might point to a cultural concurrence against inhumane
treatment, but the meaning of inhumane treatment is very dif-
ferent in many cultures. It is an illusion to hope for a civiliza-
42 Sinha, The Missing First Step in the Human Rights Movement, American
Branch, I.L.A. Proc. & Comm. Reports 71, 73 (1985-86).
" The Committee was composed of James A.R. Nafziger (Chairman), Robert L.
Bard, Thomas Buergenthal, Lung-Chu Chen, Anthony D'Amato, Thomas H. Franck,
Malvina Halberstam, Hurst Hannum, Joan F. Hartman, Louis Henkin, Farrokh
Jhabvala, Sidney Liskofsky, Bert B. Lockwood, David A. Martin, Jordan J. Paust, W.
Michael Reisman, Charles D. Siegal, S. Prakash Sinha, Louis Sohn, and Amy Young. See
id. at 72.
" See id. at 71.
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tional uniformity in the world, nor is that uniformity necessary
for securing human existence on earth.
Secondly, the regional argument is probably pointing to the
fact of regional treaties as filling the axiological gap that exists
in the international bill. However, as seen above, there are two
regional treaties in operation, the European the Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the American
Convention on Human Rights. Both of these variations are
within the folds of the Western civilization. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the regional systems have provided for the civiliza-
tional pluralism for which we have argued. In addition to these
two treaties, the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights has recently come into effect. Although this Charter
has its own vagueness and inadequacies, it does make a con-
scious reference to the historical tradition and the values of Afri-
can civilization in its preamble and it mandates the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to undertake re-
search on African problems in this field (Article 45(1)(a)) and to
apply African customs and practices (Article 61). However, civi-
lizations other than the Western and the African cannot be said
to have been accounted for by the regional systems. In any case,
if the objective of the international bill is to provide protection
to the human being on a world-wide scale, it is incongruous for
it to pass the buck to non-existent regional systems.
A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS
The International Covenants must provide a structure of in-
ternational legal accountability on the part of States for the
physical and spiritual protection of the human beings living
within their jurisdiction, and a precise specification of that pro-
tection for all the peoples of the world living in different civiliza-
tions where these States operate. These Covenants have come a
long way in achieving both of these objectives. The achievements
are especially remarkable when we remind ourselves that we live
in a society of States. However, the Covenants are in need of
enhancing their axiological relevance by rewriting their specifica-
tion of the protection sought for the human being.
The areas of human existence which are of concern to these
Covenants are: integrity of the person, personal relationships,
social assertion, economic well-being, political assertion, and
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conflict resolution. A plurality of approaches exists in our multi-
civilizational world with respect to these matters, each civiliza-
tion being possessed of its own value system governing these
matters which has been produced by its own particular historic-
ity. Although the Covenants cannot be condemned for being ex-
clusively of Western values, they are predominantly so and they
do not take an adequate account of other value systems. Nor do
they contain sufficient awareness of some of the particular
problems of human existence in non-Western societies, such as,
for example, the ruinous system of dowry in India.
The argument of this article is to strengthen these Cove-
nants by abandoning their single-catalog approach for enumer-
ating the specific values protected for the human being and by
amending these instruments to provide a pluralistic design suit-
able for our multi-civizational world.
39
